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In the Moldova elections, the Russian FSB-SVR was defeated, while the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces won.
After 99.8% of ballots have been processed, it appears Maia Sandu won the second round of the presidential elections in Moldova, having gained more than 57% of the votes. Her rival incumbent Igor Dodon has secured a little over 42% of the vote, which rules out any surprises in the ultimate outcome.
It would even be shameful for Igor Dodon to challenge election results with such a serious margin, and inappropriate to convene his own “Maidan”. Although, of course, it’s yet to be seen what his employers are up for in order to maintain their positions on the Moldovan bridgehead. Also, it’s unclear what else can the opponents do under the guise of “protests for Dodon and for the pro-Russian vector”, especially if we look at the electoral map.
Speaking about Sandu’s win and Dodon’s loss, it should be understood that we are talking about the victory of Vladislav Surkov, or GRU’s group, and the defeat of the team led by deputy head of the Russian presidential administration, Dmitry Kozak (FSB-SVR).
Igor Dodon was under the full control of the “Moldavian department” in the office led by Vladimir Chernov, where the direct curator of the Moldovan president was Igor Maslov, a veteran of the Russian intelligence service. Through Chernov’s apparatus, he reported directly to the SVR Headquarters and Dmitry Kozak, who is in charge of relations with the CIS countries and the Eurasian Economic Union.
As for Sandu, she has no connections or any affiliation with the Russian GRU and Surkov’s group, although she completely suits the military intel as a counterweight to the rival FSB’s Dodon.
Kozak, through Dodon, had persistently been trying to integrate the so-called Transnistrian People’s Republic into Moldova. First of all, since the Kozak office proceeded from economic feasibility and the possibility of profiting off of a larger victim — Moldova itself.
In turn, such a scenario did not suit Surkov’s office, because for the GRU and Russian defense ministry in general, it is important to maintain the Moldova conflict in a frozen state. This is a smoldering hot spot that can always be reescalated, for which funds would be allocated from the national budget. This is additional funding of the Russian military to maintain their contingent of both the so-called “peacekeepers” and the “unrecognized armies.” And the main thing is smuggling and a whole set of shadow traffic the GRU controls in the rogue territories.
The GRU in Moldova had its own candidate — Renat Usatii — who lost the first round. Sandu’s decent result came as a surprise to many. And a stake was made — if it’s not Usatii who professes the concept of the GRU’s”endless frozen conflict”, let it be a pro-Western politician who, based on her views, will never accept the unrecognized republic and will, de facto, support the GRU’s concept.
But the game against Kozak had been launched much earlier than the presidential elections in Moldova kicked off. In the third quarter of 2020, the GRU launched an unprecedented media attack on the FSB-SVR, leaking all nuances of Dodon’s handling by the SVR.
For example, on October 19, investigative journalists with RISE Moldova and Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s Dossier, the project under the patronage of the GRU, released a report stating that the career of Moldovan President Igor Dodon has all the way been accompanied by cooperation with former and active operatives of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) and that he remains in Moscow’s reins.
In addition, Dodon was deprived of part of his electorate that switched for Renat Usatii, although, according to the logic of things, these two politicians are much closer to each other ideologically than to the pro-Western Sandu. Unfortunately for Dodon, though, they are being handled by rivaling intelligence agencies.
The FSB-SVR responded to the provocations by leaking information on how the GRU supervised the spin of fake news about the MH17 crash through their pocket “investigative journalists” with Bonanza Media — Max van der Werff and Yana Yerlashova, of whom I wrote earlier. But this could no longer influence the process of the FSB-SVR losing control in Moldova, being nothing more than a retaliatory bite.
As a result, Dmitry Kozak’s team is losing Moldova and its concept, while Surkov’s office keeps the situation with Transnistria at the level that’s beneficial to the GRU, while a pro-Western politician wins in Moldova. Another Pyrrhic victory in November 2020…